Schopenhauer il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione pdf

The concept of transcendental in Salomon Maimon’s ‘Versuch’. In this study, I focus on the originality of Salomon Maimon’s transcendental philosophy. Maimon proposes, following a skeptical procedure that, unmasking the presuppositions admitted by Kant allows the tracing of a new philosophical way beyond the Kantian dualism. In particular, Maimon doubts the existence of synthetic judgments and proposes that Kant resolved the quaestio juris but not the quaestio rationis concerning the subsumption of intuitions to categories. Through the introduction of an infinite intellect (that is, of an analytical unity of knowledge that excludes the necessity of posing the transcendental apperception “I think”) in his philosophy, Maimon succeeds in indicating that the bond between a determined subject and a specific predicate is not contingent, but tightly necessary. For Maimon, knowledge does not proceed from the subsumption of intuitions to categories; it rather consists in the progressive determination of general concepts: for example, behind the judgment “the fire heats the stone,” there is no previous subsumption of a manifold (the intuition of fire and the intuition of a stone) to a form (in this case, to the category of causality) but rather the progressive determination of the concept of cause–effect. Knowledge begins with a relationship, which is gradually determined not through the subsumption of a manifold, but through the discovery of the specifications and determinations (contained in the infinite intellect) of the initially perceived relationship. The knowing subject does not have to confer an order on a chaotic multiplicity; knowledge has to do with relationships, laws, and dependences, i.e., it has to do with differentials of perception. However, because of our narrowness, the human intellect is unable to overcome the realm of representation (Vorstellung in Maimon’s philosophy corresponds to the illusion that objects are external, in a transcendental sense, to the subject), and it will always be brought to believe that the objects of its knowledge exist independently from the relationship with other objects. Human and defective knowledge does not succeed in overcoming the dichotomies subject–object, form–contained, and subsumption–given. This skepticism about the possibility of synthetic judgments also has some consequences for the vision of the relationship between subject and object: for Maimon there is no assimilation of one to the other: the intellect does not impose its forms to things it perceive; on the contrary, it lets objects emerge according to their own rules. Further, for Maimon, knowledge does not result from the production (through functions present a priori in the subject) of bonds between single (and disconnected) perceptions. Rather, for him, knowledge is progress that proceeds through a continuous increase of relationships that reciprocally connect, producing a system of functions whose numbers is always increasing. In my study, I show that, as a consequence, some central concepts of Kantian philosophy radically change in Maimon’s thinking: Vorstellung, Darstellung, imagination (which for Maimon is principle of individualization), noumenon, and thing-in-itself. In particular, the noumenon is for Maimon an idea, and the thing-in-itself represents the complete determination of a concept; therefore, neither of them constitutes a substratum external to thought, but they are the final goal that our defective knowledge is trying to achieve. After having analyzed the meaning of those concepts in Maimon’s philosophy, I focus on the role and task of transcendental philosophy: for Maimon it does not investigate the rules and the limits of knowledge; rather it must track and describe operations carried out by infinite intellect of which subjective, imperfect thought is only a reflection. Metaphysics does not deal with what is beyond experience, but with what is found at the limits of our possible knowledge.

This paper focuses on J.G. Fichte’s and M. Blondel’s “philosophy of freedom”: in their different philosophical perspectives these authors defend the human freedom with important arguments and theorize the philosophy as "education for freedom". The first section of the work discusses the overcoming of determinism (Überwindung des Determinismus) in Fichte’s Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 1796-99). According to the German philosopher, the will is the foundation of human thought, and the cognitive act (Bestimmung) is an “act of free will” (Willensbestimmung). The second section analyzes the study and the revival of Fichte’s transcendental philosophy in French culture of nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, we have examined authors as Maine de Biran, Jules Lequier, and especially Maurice Blondel. Even in these prospects freedom is interpreted as the foundation of knowledge , as the condition of possibility of thought and being: «libersum, ergo cogito, ergo sum». Blondel has theorized a “science of practical” focused on human action. In his first work (L’ Action,1893) he makes an important distinction between the willing will (volonté voulante) and the willed will (volonté voulue): the willing will is the desire for the infinite that is in man, is the transcendence of the ego. Through these considerations on the “metaphysics of subject” Blondel comes to deal with the relationship between philosophy and Christianity, the natural and the supernatural.

Cosa significa il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione?

Cosa è la volontà per Schopenhauer?

Quale filosofo descrisse il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione?

Che cosa possiamo conoscere del mondo secondo Schopenhauer?